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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate whether or not mutual guarantee consortia (MGC), a financial 
institution well developed in Italy, alleviate the difficulties that Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) face when they ask for a bank loan. We find that the probability of a 
small firm affiliated to a MGC of going into default is lower than that of firms not affiliated 
to such a consortium. These results indicate that MGCs improve the ability of banks to 
screen and monitor small firms. 
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1. Introduction
1
 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) encounter often problems in financing 
their investment projects because, due to their opaqueness and short credit history, 
banks’ have a scarce ability in assessing their merit of credit. Informational 
asymmetries in the selection and monitoring process of SMEs traditionally hampers 
the overall amount of credit granted by banks to small firms and increase the amount 
of collateral (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Berger and Udell, 2006). In response to such 
problems, in the early 50s in North-Eastern Italy emerged a peculiar financial 
intermediary, the Mutual Guarantee Consortium (MGC), specifically targeted to lever 
on the pooled financial and productive resources of a group of small firms to gain 
collectively better credit conditions and greater resources from the banking system. 
A contractual scheme emerged to address the asymmetric information problem 
afflicting lending contracts with the SMEs under which banks lend individually to 
each firm of a group of borrowers linked by a joint responsibility for the loan.
2
 This 
contract design is very helpful in mitigating asymmetric information because every 
firm of the group is better informed than banks about other members’ characteristics 
and behavior. Thus, the members accepting a joint responsibility for a loan convey a 
good signal to banks about their creditworthiness. Moreover, under this kind of 
lending technology, group members agree to share the loss in the case of default by an 
affiliated firm being therefore motivated to monitor each other.
3
  
Another reason for this contractual scheme to be successful in improving credit 
market access for SMEs is that, notwithstanding each firm suffers individually of a 
lack of collateral, by pooling their resources the firms can provide the lender, on top 
                                                          
1 We would like to thank seminar participants at SUERF conference “Financing SMEs in Europe” for 
useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the 
authors only and in no way involve the responsibility of the Bank of Italy. This article is forthcoming 
on Revue Bancaire et Financiere / Bank en Financiezewen. 
2 For a review of group lending and microfinance, see among others, Armendáriz and Morduch (2005). 
3 This mechanism is similar to a collective credit agreement. Differently from the standard bilateral 
creditor–borrower debt contract, such agreement involves, on a collective basis, a group of borrowers 
without collateral who are linked by a ‘‘joint-responsibility’’ default clause: if any member of the 
group defaults, other members have to repay to the bank her share of the debt, or else the entire group 
loses access to future refinancing (Armendáriz, 1999). 
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of the standard collateral which may be used on a rotating basis, with the social capital 
embedded in the group.  
The aim of this paper is to analyze whether Italian MGCs improve the quality of 
bank lending. In Italy each member of the consortium contributes to a guarantee fund 
from which is drawn collateral posted to loans granted by banks to MGC members. 
This consortium is therefore an institutional device that puts under the same 
responsibility a group of small firms that need bank lending but individually have a 
limited collateral capacity. Since members are mostly part of the same local 
community, peer-monitoring is in place and our hypothesis is that it significantly 
reduces moral hazard. 
SMEs are quite widespread in the old continent. The 2005 European 
Commission data state that there are more than 20 millions firms in Europe providing 
employment for more than 140 million people and that over two thirds of all jobs are 
provided by SMEs. Italy according to the last national census of 2001 had four 
millions firms with less than 50 employees representing therefore a case in favor of 
the relevance of the MGCs for the economy given the weight of the SMEs on the 
overall number of firms. 
According to the 2005 data by the European Mutual Guarantee Association, in 
the European Union there are more than 1.4 million of SMEs affiliated to a MGC. The 
diffusion of MGCs is particularly relevant in Germany, France, Spain and Italy. Italian 
MGCs represent, however, the largest component of the European mutual guarantee 
sector accounting for almost 40 per cent of the total outstanding volume of guarantees 
to SMEs. 
MGCs mitigate problems of access to bank lending, for those SMEs which are 
not sufficiently endowed with collateral or lack of a sufficient track record or credit 
history, in different ways. First, they supply personal and real guarantees to the bank 
allowing for a partial coverage of potential losses of SME lending. In the new 
financial set-up designed by Basel II the relevance of these guarantee schemes is 
growing since they may also offer the possibility, under certain conditions, of a 
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mitigation of the risk associated with banks’ SME portfolio and a reduction in 
regulatory capital requirements for financial intermediaries.
4
 Second, MGCs provide 
screening and monitoring activity of affiliated firms together with peer-monitoring 
activity. Third, MGCs negotiate collectively interest rates and other conditions with 
banks. 
Usually these consortia are founded by firms and are located in the headquarters 
of the business associations that promote them, or hosted by chambers of commerce. 
This helps information sharing among firms within the business association and the 
MGC association. Italian MGCs are typically affiliated to business associations by 
means of federations that provide organizational assistance, including staff support, 
technical equipment and premises. They also lobby local and national government and 
chambers of commerce to provide the MGC association with funds. 
Italy represents a good laboratory to assess the role of MGCs in enhancing 
SMEs credit conditions also because of the richness of data. In particular, we have 
access to a unique dataset obtained from the Italian Credit Register on loans to firms 
with less than 20 employees. Using this dataset we are able to verify if the probability 
of a small firm affiliated to a consortium to go into default is lower than that for firms 
not affiliated to a MGC.
5
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the activity 
and the institutional characteristics of MGCs. Section 3 presents our results on the 
quality of the loans assisted by a MGC guarantee and robustness checks, while the 
final section concludes. 
                                                          
4 The new Basel II accord qualifies most MGCs as guarantors, if their guarantee product is in line with 
the regulatory requirement. This will allow banks, other things being equal, to reduce regulatory capital 
on their SME loan portfolio. 
5 In a companion paper (Columba, Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2008) we find that MGC affiliation 
reduces, other things being equal, the cost of lending for affiliated SMEs. We also detect the existence 
of an optimal scale for MGCs and of a negative impact of public contributions to the overall 
performance of a consortium. 
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2. Facts and institutional aspects of mutual guarantee consortia 
Italian MGCs have to be entered in a special register (ex art. 107 of the Italian 
Banking Law) and are subject to prudential regulation only when they reach a specific 
threshold of activity. Italian MGCs are typically constituted under the form of 
guarantee cooperatives, which are non-profit companies for the support of the 
members, and with the creation of a syndicated fund.
6
 
The primary activity of these consortia is to provide members with guarantees to 
be posted as collateral to bank loans. For this purpose, a guarantee fund (generally 
monetary) is established and deposited at a bank, being funded by members through 
fixed membership fees and commissions proportional to the loans granted (0.2 to 1.0 
per cent of the financing for the period in which the guarantee is used).
7
 The bank 
with which the MGC has an agreement is willing to grant credit to member enterprises 
for a “multiple” of the guarantee fund.
8
 Personal guarantees may also be used directly 
by the affiliated firms and included in a personal guarantee fund managed by the 
consortium. In case of insolvency the bank notifies the MGC of an action to recover 
the loan and requests the guarantee fund to take action. The MGC checks the request 
and if it is justified, authorizes the bank to draw the amount corresponding to the risk 
assumed by the consortium (typically 50 per cent of the loss). The bank proceeds with 
the action to recover the loan, on the conclusion of which, it informs the MGC of the 
degree of success achieved. If the action is successful the bank reimburses the amount 
                                                          
6 The capital endowment of a MGC (legal capital and risk funds) has to be greater than 250.000 euro. 
Capital and risk funds may also be subscribed by third parties (local and central government, chambers 
of commerce, international organizations, business associations). However, at least one fifth of the 
capital endowment has to be paid out by affiliated firms. On the base of information released by two of 
the MGCs associations, Fedart and Federconfidi, around one third of MGCs capital endowment is paid 
by SMEs. 
7 Some MGIs with a low amount of funding or guarantees may ask for a deposit of around 5 per cent of 
the amount of the loan that is returned when the loan is repaid. 
8 In Italy the ratio reaches typically a maximum value that goes from 10 to 20. However on the basis of 
the data available for a sub-sample of MGIs the effective ratio between guarantees and loans is around 
3 (see Table 1) and it is linked to the pattern of past losses incurred with respect to the mutual 
guarantee fund. In other countries the limit of the “multiplier” may be fixed by national law. For 
example, in Germany and Switzerland the amount of credit granted may not exceed 10 times the 
guarantee fund.  
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successful the bank reimburses the amount advanced by the guarantee fund. If it is not 
successful, the loss to the MGC is final.
9
 
At the end of 2004, more than one half of Italian MGCs was affiliated to one of 
the five main federations: Fedart-Fidi (crafts), Federconfidi and Fincredit 
(manufacturing), Federascomfidi and Federfidi (commerce, service and tourism), for a 
total of almost one million of affiliated firms (Table 1). MGCs in Italy are organized 
by homogenous activity and this, potentially, may increase the overall risk. However, 
a high degree of positive correlation in business activity amplifies peer monitoring 
and thereby reduces the incidence of strategic default; moreover, keeping operations 
within a limited geographical area allows for a thorough knowledge of the local 
firms.
10
 
One feature of the Italian MGC system is that it is heterogeneously developed 
among geographical areas. MGC activity is concentrated in the North where the 
presence of small and medium sized firms is more widespread. MGC are less 
developed in the South and the Islands (Mezzogiorno) both in terms of number of 
affiliated firms, average capital of consortia and value of guarantees (Figure 1). This 
may depend not only on the small number of firms that have the necessary 
characteristics to join a MGC in this part of Italy but also on other three facts: i) 
greater availability of public funds for firms located in the Mezzogiorno, ii) the 
relatively recent development of MGC system in the South, iii) the high degree of 
opacity of SME in these regions. At the end of 2004, credit guaranteed by MGC 
represented around 8 per cent of total lending to SMEs in the Mezzogiorno against 13 
per cent in the Centre and in the North. 
                                                          
9 At the second level of the guarantee system, there are sometimes second-tier mutual consortia that are 
set up by groups of MGI. Their function is to reinsure, or in other words to counter-guarantee, MGI in 
order to reach a broader sharing of the financial risk involved. At the same level reinsurance entities 
funded by regional governments may operate. 
10 The average number of affiliated firms per MGC varies between a minimum of 634 in the 
manufacturing sector to a maximum of 2.598 in the commerce sector. The total value of loans backed 
by mutual guarantees exceeds 20 billions euro; around one third is under the form of short-term 
lending. Total guarantees amounted to 7.8 billions, with an average value of the loan-to-guarantee ratio 
of more than 3. Guarantees are mainly composed by monetary funds that represent between 73 and 90 
per cent of the total. Personal guarantees are more developed in the manufacturing sector where the 
average size of firms is higher. 
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According to information obtained by the Italian Credit Register (CR), at the 
end of June 2005 around 55 per cent of Italian banks (excluding branches of foreign 
banks) lent to SME affiliated with a consortium (Table 2). Around one third of firms 
affiliated to a MGC had lending relationship with large banks (those with total assets 
of more than 20 billions euro); the percentage was equal to 22 per cent for medium 
banks (with total asset between 7 and 20 billions) and to 46 per cent for small banks 
(those with total assets less than 7 billions). 
3. Are SMEs affiliated to a MGC less risky ? 
In this section we study whether MGCs help to mitigate the asymmetric 
information problems that typically characterize the credit relationships between small 
firms and banks. In particular, our aim is to verify if the probability for a small firm 
affiliated to a MGC to go into default is lower than that for firms not affiliated to a 
MGC. 
The sample is made of around 385,000 small firms, of which more than 50,000 
had a guarantee given by MGCs at June 2005. Table 3 highlights a remarkable 
difference in the ratio between bad loans and lending among firms in the two Italian 
areas; in June 2005 the ratio was equal to 7 per cent in Central and Northern Italy and 
23 per cent for the southern firms.
11
 However, the difference in the quality of bank 
lending between the two Italian areas drops drastically when we limit our observation 
only to firms which are affiliated to a MGC; in this case the ratio is equal to 4 per cent 
in the Centre and in the North, to 6 per cent in the South. 
The analysis of the ratio between bad loans and lending is not sufficient 
however to establish if firms which are affiliated to a MGC are on average less risky. 
The low ratio is very likely influenced also by the fact that banks obtain directly from 
the MGC a substantial coverage of losses in the case of defaults and this mechanically 
reduces the amount of their credit portfolio that is considered “bad”. In other words, 
bad loans may be lower in the case of a firm affiliated to a MGC just because of the 
                                                          
11 These ratios are very similar to those calculated for all small firms in the two areas (6 and 19 per 
cent, respectively) confirming the reliability of the sample used in our econometric analysis. 
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because of the direct use of the guarantee fund. On the base of the data provided by 
Fedart-Fidi, in the occurrence of a firm’s default in more than 50 per cent of the cases 
banks proceed with an immediate action to obtain the guarantee funds: this determines 
a fast reduction in the volume of bad loans. In one quarter of the cases the bank may 
set aside on their pledge account the guaranteed share; in the remaining cases the 
acquisition of the guarantee occurs at the end of the legal procedure. In all cases, the 
time to recovery of credit positions is greatly reduced and this determines a low ratio 
between bad debt and total lending. 
In order to evaluate if firms associated with a MGC are, other things being equal, 
less risky with respect to other small firms, we estimate the probability that a unit of 
lending is classified as bad loans taking into account firm-specific characteristics: 
affiliation to a MGC, geographic location, application to the register for artisan 
companies, firm’s size, sector of economic activity. 
In particular, the econometric analysis has been carried out using the following 
probit model that estimates the probability that the i-th firm is classified as a bad debt 
from at least one of the banks that grant it credit (Pri(baddebt = 1)). 
(1) )543210(1Pr
1
∑
=
++++++==
Nj
j
jiSectorjMonoiiSizeiArtiSouthiMLGCΦ)(baddebti ηδδδδδδ  
The meaning of all the variables is reported in Table 4.  
Results reported in Table 4 show that, coeteris paribus, the probability to go 
into default for small firms affiliated to a MGC is 5 per cent less with respect to other 
companies with similar characteristics.  
All other explanatory variables have the predicted signs. For firms borrowing 
from only one bank the default probability drops of 11 percentage points; this 
evidence is coherent with the hypothesis of a higher quality of screening and 
monitoring activity by intermediaries that are engaged in close lending relationships 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and their greater propensity to debt restructuring (Berglof 
and Von Thadden, 1994; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). The probability that a unit of 
loan of a Southern firm is classified as a bad debt is 13 percentage points higher than 
for other companies in the sample; it is significantly lower for big firms. 
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The second column of Table 4 reports a different specification that considers as 
additional explanatory variable the interaction term (δ6*MGC*South). Results show 
that affiliation to a MGC for a Southern firm can be associated to a probability to be 
classified as bad debt that is lower of around 11 percentage points (δ1+δ6 = -0.111). 
This probability is higher of one percentage points for small Southern firms that have 
business relationship with only one bank, while it is lower of 5 percentage points if 
these firms are affiliated to a MGC (third column of Table 4). 
These results may depend upon the fact that banks that operate with MGCs have 
specific characteristics. For example, such banks may have a greater attitude toward 
renegotiation of debt with respect to other intermediaries determining a lower number 
of bad loans. To verify the reliability of previous results we have integrated our probit 
specification with bank fixed effects (fourth column of Table 4). Results confirm that 
the affiliation to MGCs improves credit quality even though the coefficient is slightly 
reduced. 
In order to corroborate these results the estimation model used above has been 
adopted to explain the probability that a firm is declared in default over the period 
June 2004 - June 2005 (Table 5). This test is particularly interesting because the 
affiliation to a MGC may reduce statistically the volume of bad loans simply because 
a significant part of the credit position is repaid. Although, considering the fact that 
the acquisition of the guarantee is generally equal to 50 per cent of the value of the 
loan, it is unlikely that the total position is taken away from the credit register in a 
year. In this way it is possible to overcome the problems that we have in estimating 
the probability that a unit of loan is into default. The analysis confirms our previous 
results. In particular, the probability that a small firm goes into default is reduced by 
around one percentage point in case of affiliation to MGCs. The reduction increases to 
3 per cent if the firm is headquartered in the South. Even in this case the introduction 
of bank fixed effects, that capture different attitudes among intermediaries towards 
debt restructuring, does not modify the results of the analysis. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have investigated whether or not mutual guarantee 
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consortium (MGC), a financial institution well developed in Italy, mitigates 
asymmetric information problems in the market for credit to Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs).  
On the base of a unique dataset obtained from the Italian Credit Register, we 
find that the probability of a small firm affiliated to a MGC of going into default is 
lower than that of firms not affiliated to such a consortium. This result indicates that 
MGCs improve the ability of banks to screen and monitor small firms. 
This result also indicates that the role of MGC in easing credit conditions of 
SMEs and their nature of consortia (based on the joint liability of borrowers) do 
increase private incentives to preserve the quality of credit aligned to the ones of 
lenders. The MGCs seems therefore good candidates to fill the existing gap between 
the two extremes, on the one hand, of credit guarantee schemes exclusively funded by 
government and, on the other hand, of private guarantees of individual borrowers. The 
MGC middle position between these two extremes could be beneficial to SMEs not 
only in terms in terms of a better quality of credit, as we have hopefully proved, but 
also of lower interest rates (Columba, Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2008), thanks to the 
exploitation of the private incentives based on the soft information available to the 
MGC members.   
Table 1 
 
MUTUAL GUARANTEE CONSORTIA IN ITALY IN 2004 (1) 
Fedart-Fidi Crafts 314 667,482 2,126
Federconfidi Industry 74 46,901 634
Fincredit Industrial SMEs 25 34,561 1,382
FederascomfidiCommerce, Service and Tourism 67 174,052 2,598
Federfidi Commerce, Service and Tourism 34 70,000 2,059
(1) Data are supplied by each Federation. - (2)  Data have been provided by Italian Foreign 
Exchange Office.
514 992,996
SectorFederations
Number of 
SMEs for 
MLGC 
(b)/(a)
1,932
Number 
of 
affiliated 
SMEs (b)
Total Italy (2) 1,073
Number of 
affiliated 
MLGCs (a)
Total of the 5 Federations
 
 
Table 2 
BANKS WITH AGREEMENTS IN PLACE WITH MUTUAL GUARANTEE CONSORTIA (MGCs)
(1) 
(June 2005) 
Cooperative 
banks 
Number of banks with agreements in place with MLGCs: (a) 17 24 355 260 396
Number of active banks (foreign branches excluded): (b) 22 33 665 440 720
     - as % of size category: (a)/(b)*100 77.3 72.7 53.4 59.1 55.0
     - as % of total (a)/396*100 4.3 6.1 89.6 65.7 100.0
Number of MLGCs in Credit Registry 365 281 512 278 600
     - as % of total MLGCs in credit Registry 60.8 46.8 85.3 46.3 100.0
Number of firms assisted and with loans guaranteed by MLGCs: (c) 18,857 12,776 27,198 9,446 58,831
Total number of firms with granted loans: (d) 180,528 94,310 205,644 78,043 480,482
    - as % of firms assisted and with granted loans by MLGCs: 
(c)/(d)*100
10.4 13.5 13.2 12.1 12.2
    - as % of total:  (c )/58.831 32.1 21.7 46.2 16.1 100.0
Percentage of the overall credit to SMEs guaranteed by MLGCs 8.3 13.5 13.2 12.1 9.3
Sources: Credit Registry and Italian Foreign Exchange Office.
(1) Guarantees granted to craftsman firms and to other firms with less than 20 employees.
Total
Small banks 
(2)
Medium 
banks (2)
Big banks 
(2)
(2) Banks are classified by size of total assets: of more than 20 billions euro for large banks,  between 20 and 7 billions for medium banks, of less than 
7 billions for small banks.
Table 3 
BAD LOANS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OUTSTANDING LOANS 
(June 2005) 
 
Agriculture Manufacturing Building Retail Services Totale
Number of 
Firms
% 
Small firms in sample
Centre-North 4,5 7,6 8,0 8,4 4,1 6,6 308.732 80,2
South 23,9 23,3 33,2 27,3 16,3 22,9 76.401 19,8
Italy 8,1 10,2 13,0 13,4 6,3 9,8 385.133 100,0
Small firms in sample 
guaranteed by MGC 
Centre-North 1,7 4,4 4,4 4,3 2,9 3,5 46.450 12,1
South 3,0 4,6 14,7 4,4 4,3 6,2 3.963 1,0
Italy 2,3 4,5 9,6 4,3 3,6 4,9 50.413 13,1
For comparison: 
Small firms total
Centre-North 5,0 7,4 6,8 7,1 4,5 6,1 2.957.451 72,8
South 18,1 21,3 26,6 18,6 12,5 19,0 1.102.654 27,2
Italy 8,0 11,1 11,0 9,1 5,8 8,7 4.060.105 100,0
Sources: Credit Register (for small firms; not available data on loans for an amount smaller than 75,000 euro and in good standing); Italian National 
Institute of Statistics, Eighth general census of manufacturing and services; Supervisory statistics (for the small firms total).
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Table 4  
PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT: OUTSTANDING BAD LOANS  
Variabili esplicative
-0,056 *** -0,052 *** -0,053 *** -0,038 ***
0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
0,135 *** 0,138 *** 0,126 *** 0,046 ***
0,002 0,002 0,003 0,003
-0,020 *** -0,020 *** -0,020 *** -0,016 ***
0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
-0,017 *** -0,017 *** -0,017 *** -0,019 ***
0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
-0,107 *** -0,107 *** -0,111 *** -0,059 ***
0,001 0,001 0,002 0,001
-0,058 *** -0,047 *** -0,037 ***
0,002 0,004 0,005
0,011 *** 0,032 ***
0,002 0,003
-0,053 *** -0,041 ***
0,006 0,007
Pseudo R
2 
0,127 0,128 0,128 0,347
Log-likelihood -109.453 -109.342 -109.341 -81.771
Number of observations 385.008 385.008 385.008 384.424
Southern Italy firm (South )
The dependent variable is the probability that a firm has a bad debt with at least one of the lending banks. Probit
estimates with fixed effects for economic activity sector. Marginal effects computed for a discrete variation of the
dummy variables form 0 to 1. Fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors with white correction are in italics. ***
1 per cent significance. ** 5 per cent. * 10 per cent.
(1)
 Benchmark 
equation
(2)                        
Differential effects 
of MGC in 
Southern Italy
firm guaranteed from a MGC (MGC )
South firm guaranteed from a MGC 
borrowing from only one bank 
(Mono*South*MGC )
South firm guaranteed from a MLGC 
(MGC*South )
(4)
Bank fixed effects
South firm borrowing from only one bank 
(Mono*South )
(3) Differential 
effects of MGC in 
Southern Italy for 
a firm borrowing 
only form one 
bank 
firm borrowing from only one bank 
(Mono )
log of loan used (Size )
artisan firm (Art )
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Table 5 
 
PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT: NEW BAD LOANS  
Variabili esplicative
-0,016 *** -0,014 *** -0,015 *** -0,008 ***
0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
0,035 *** 0,036 *** 0,026 *** 0,001
0,002 -0,032 0,003 0,001
-0,032 *** -0,033 *** -0,032 *** -0,021 ***
0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
-0,011 *** -0,011 *** -0,011 *** -0,012 ***
0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
-0,046 *** -0,046 *** -0,051 *** -0,029 ***
0,001 0,001 0,002 0,001
-0,021 *** -0,016 *** -0,008 ***
0,002 0,002 0,003
0,011 *** 0,027 ***
0,002 0,002
-0,019 *** -0,019 ***
0,003 0,003
Pseudo R
2 
0,113 0,114 0,115 0,174
Log-likelihood -60.024 -59.980 -59.935 -55.886
Number of observations 385.008 385.008 385.008 383.764
firm guaranteed from a MGC (MGC )
South firm guaranteed from a MGC 
borrowing from only one bank 
(Mono*South*MGC )
South firm guaranteed from a MGC 
(MGC*South )
South firm borrowing from only one bank 
(Mono*South )
firm borrowing from only one bank 
(Mono )
log of loan used (Size )
artisan firm (Art )
Southern Italy firm (South )
The dependent variable is the probability that a firm was classified between June 2004 and June 2005 as having a
bad debt with at least one of the lending banks. Probit estimates with fixed effects for economic activity sector.
Marginal effects computed for a discrete variation of the dummy variables form 0 to 1. Fixed effects are not
reported. Standard errors with white correction are in italics. *** 1 per cent significance. ** 5 per cent. * 10 per
cent.
(1)
 Benchmark 
equation
(2)                        
Differential effects 
of MGC in 
Southern Italy
(4)
Bank fixed effects
(3) Differential 
effects of MGC in 
Southern Italy for 
a firm borrowing 
only form one 
bank 
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 Figure 1 
 
MUTUAL GUARANTEE CONSORTIA (MGC) ACTIVITY BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS 
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